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Frane Adam / Matev Tomič (Ljubljana)
Elites, Democracy and Development
in Post-Socialist Transition
Auf der Grundlage umfangreicher empirischer Daten aus Forschungen über die Elitenbildungs-
prozesse in den post-sozialistischen Ländern und mit Hilfe anderer Indikatoren der politisch-ökono-
mischen Entwicklung untersuchen die Autoren, wie sich Muster der Elitenreproduktion bzw. -zirkulation
auf Prozesse der Demokratisierung und der sozioökonomischen Entwicklung auswirken. Sie behan-
deln dabei ein bisher eher vernachlässigtes Thema: die Frage, wie sich zwischen den beiden Segmen-
ten der politischen Elite, die Pareto als die regierende und die nicht-regierende Elite bezeichnet hat,
ein Gleichgewicht herstellen lässt.
1. Introduction
There is no doubt that (political) elites are a
significant  sometimes even a decisive  fac-
tor for democratization and social change. This
was confirmed also in the case of post-commu-
nist Eastern Europe, which actually represents
a very interesting laboratory for surveying the
emergence of the new elite structure as well as
for the transformation and accommodation of
the old one. Strictly speaking, we should speak
instead of a proto-elite, meaning the rudimen-
tary structure of an elite configuration which is
only now evolving into a more consolidated and
articulate form.
Classic sociological and political science lit-
erature (see Etzioni-Halevy 1997) has already
developed the thesis that elites, even though they
often aspire towards self-preservation and the
protection of their own interests, are not a static
and homogeneous category but are in constant,
albeit slow transformation. Or, as already
phrased somewhat metaphorically by Pareto
(1997/1935, 49): It flows on like a river, never
being today what it was yesterday. It is there-
fore very significant to ascertain what is going
on inside elite groups, how open they are to new
members and new ideas, and what kind of rela-
tions are being established among their differ-
ent sectors and factions. In this sense, the ques-
tion concerning elite circulation is at the centre
of the theoretical and empirical research inter-
ests of social scientists dealing with issues con-
cerning social change (this is also the point made
in the recent contribution of Higley and Lengyel
2000).
Extensive empirical research on political, cul-
tural and economic elites  usually defined as
positional or functional elites  has been con-
ducted in practically all post-socialist states dur-
ing the first half of the 1990s. These studies were
of a more descriptive nature, yet even so they
have offered a point departure for profound,
ongoing discussions that deal with a complex
phenomenon, which is hard to analyse in depth
with insufficiently effective methodological
tools. These studies that rely mostly on stratifi-
cation and mobility approaches have focused
on the demographic and class characteristics of
new or renovated old elites, as well as on their
value and ideological orientations. To some ex-
tent, they offer a picture of the relation between
reproduction and circulation. However, it is in-
teresting that relatively little effort has been di-
rected towards the study of the relation between
the elite configuration and the attained degree
of democratisation (or quality of democracy),
or developmental performance.
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As the authors of this paper, we are mostly
interested in how the relation between the re-
production and circulation of (political) elites
is reflected in the characteristics of the
democratisation processes and in the socio-eco-
nomic modernisation of transitional societies
(especially Slovenia). It is evident that this is a
demanding and multi-layered topic. In this text,
we have, so we hope, succeeded to examine
some aspects of it and to open some new ques-
tions. Perhaps it would be more precise to say
that our undertaking is a reactualisation of old
issues in a new context.
2. Elite configuration in post-socialist
societies
One of the characteristics of post-socialist
political elites is their heterogeneity. Namely,
they are made up of individuals as well as groups
of various social and historical origins and ideo-
logical orientations: former dissidents of diverse
provenance, more or less reformist members of
the ex-communist nomenclature, members of
professional groups (so-called technocrats),
people from the sphere of the Church and even
some members of pre-war political elites.1  Ac-
cording to Agh (1996, 45) the transitional po-
litical elite possesses a number of common char-
acteristics, including its distance toward the non-
elite and a lack of professionalism. For this rea-
son society perceives this social group as a uni-
fied actor which monopolises politics and ex-
erts control over all social life. However, there
are numerous antagonisms and conflicts exist-
ing among various elite segments including es-
pecially competition for control over key re-
sources which actors try to obtain through dif-
ferent social linkages (search for allies, various
coalitions). All this implies that we are not
dealing with a uniform group.
Social conditions in the countries of the
former communist block are, to a large extent,
characterized by the relationship between so-
called old and new elites, i.e., between elites
derived from the ranks of the former regime and
the relatively heterogeneous elites formed dur-
ing the process of systemic transition. It must,
however, be stressed that it is often difficult to
make a clear-cut division between old and new
elites. Even the former nomenclature has in fact
experienced various transformations, and part
of it has embraced (at least formally) democratic
principles and norms. Thus the thought and ac-
tion patterns which are essentially a relic of the
former undemocratic system are often present
to varying degrees in recently-founded politi-
cal parties.
Nevertheless, one of the key questions of post-
socialist transformations concerns the position
and role of former holders of monopolistic so-
cial power, i.e., members of former communist
elites: in other words, whether and to what ex-
tent were they able to retain key social resources
and thereby continue to influence the develop-
ment of these societies. In view of this, there
are two interpretations of post-socialist condi-
tions. The theory of elite reproduction holds that
changes in Eastern and Central Europe did not
have an impact on the composition of elites,
since the nomenclature was able to stay at the
top of the social structure and become the new
grand bourgeoisie. According to the theory of
elite circulation however, these transformations
are brought about by structural changes at the
top of the social hierarchy, i.e., key positions
occupied by new people on the basis of new
principles (Szelenyi/Szelenyi 1995, 616). When
considering the position of the former commu-
nist elite in the new conditions, it is necessary,
on the one hand, to analyze its present political
role, namely to what extent was it able to stay
on the political scene and to retain at least a part
of its power through new mechanisms of politi-
cal recruitment. On the other hand, one should
ascertain how much political power it was able
to retain in other ways, particularly by trans-
forming political and social capital into eco-
nomic capital or other resources.
It has to be stressed that the political position
of successor parties of the nomenclature differs
considerably from country to country. In coun-
tries where the communist party reformed gradu-
ally, embraced systemic changes, and was also
actively involved in this process, it became an
equal partner on the political scene. This holds
true for the situation in Hungary, in Slovenia
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and partly in the case of Poland. While the
former communist party elite may have lost its
political monopoly, its reformed faction suc-
ceeded in establishing itself relatively firmly in
the political arena. A definite confirmation of
their successful political survival was both the
1993 parliamentary elections in Poland and the
1994 elections in Hungary, where the successor
parties of the communist party won and assumed
power. In both countries, however, the situation
changed with the following parliamentary elec-
tions (in 1997 in Poland and in 1998 in Hun-
gary), when the political parties of centre-right
orientation, which had no ties with the former
communist party, were voted back into power.
Consequently, it can be affirmed that in these
two countries, at least at the level of legitimate
political power, a kind of balance was achieved,
i.e., there was circulation among the competing
political elites, and the fundamental principles
of parliamentary democracy are accepted by all.
In the Czech Republic, however, the situation
is quite different: The communist party elite 
owing to its obstinate opposition to change 
lost almost all legitimacy, was practically thrown
out of power, and the regime quickly crumbled.
Here the key roles are played by the parties of
the centre-right (Citizens Democratic Party)
and of the centre-left (Social Democratic Party),
which are not of communist origin (this is in
fact a new political elite). However, the situa-
tion was quite different in Slovakia, where the
political forces which stem mainly from the
former communist structures (such as the Move-
ment for Democratic Slovakia headed by
Vladimir Mečiar), have ruled the country for
the major part of the 90s. Only with the 1998
elections did the ruling power shift to a coali-
tion of democratic parties.
In the countries of south-eastern Europe (Bul-
garia, Romania, Albania and the former Yugo-
slavia, excluding Slovenia and Croatia) and in
the countries of the former Soviet Union (ex-
cluding the Baltic states), communist party elites
managed to retain their power even after the first
democratic multi-party elections and to reform
to a much lesser extent (even though in this case
as well it accepted the system of parliamentary
democracy). In this way they retained key roles
in social development, which meant a slowdown
and a lack of thoroughness in systemic changes.
Of course in this context as well conditions dif-
fer from case to case. In Bulgaria, and later also
in Romania, new political elites gained so much
strength that they assumed power, thus paving
the way for more radical social reforms, the suc-
cessful implementation of which is questionable
because of a relative feebleness of the new elite
and a severe socio-economic situation. (In Ro-
mania, the new political forces were defeated at
the most recent parliamentary elections and the
government again returned into the hands of the
reformed communists.) The most extreme cases
of continuity in terms of the communist origin
of political elites and the mode of government
are Belarus and, until recently (October 2000),
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These are
two cases of single-party rule (even though for-
mally other parties also exist) to a large extent
tied to a personality cult of the head of state.
The ruling neo-communist elite controls most
of the key positions in society, while the eco-
nomic system is somewhere between state in-
terventionism and chaotic  jungle law.
According to some interpretations, the find-
ings of empirical research (in the framework of
the project Social Stratification in Eastern Eu-
rope after 1989) do not categorically corrobo-
rate either the theory of reproduction or the
theory of circulation (Szelenyi/Szelenyi 1995,
636). It is evident that in the process of post-
socialist transition no revolutionary changes
have occurred in this region. Thus a part of the
old elite  mainly its bureaucratic faction  left
the elite, but a large part of the elite of the late
1980s retained its key position. In addition, those
who dropped out of the elite as a rule did not
drop very far but took up positions that still
wielded some power. In some countries (par-
ticularly in Hungary and Poland), a large por-
tion of the nomenclature retired, which did not
necessarily mean that they had regressed on the
social scale (many of them continued to be ac-
tive as consultants, etc.). On the other hand, a
large portion of post-socialist elites is made up
of people who did not belong to the nomencla-
ture. However, in the case of these new mem-
bers, usually no great structural shifts occurred
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since most of them came from the ranks of pro-
fessionals and mid-level bureaucracy, i.e., those
who at the end of the 1980s wielded at least
some power (Szelenyi/Szelenyi 1995, 622ff.).
The reproduction of elites in Russia is under-
standable since the social changes in that coun-
try occurred more slowly, were less fundamen-
tal, and no strong counter-elite existed that could
have pushed out the communist party person-
nel. Thus, under conditions of relative social
instability where democratic institutions do not
function properly, communist party personnel
has the advantage over the new players. In the
case of Hungary and Poland, the principle of
circulation of elites has greater weight.2  This
can be accounted for by a relatively well devel-
oped civil society (in comparison to Russia) and
a strong political counter-elite, which defeated
the former communists in the first free elections.
A research study on the profile of the national
elite was conducted also in the Czech Republic.
Results indicate that in the case of the economic
elite, the level of reproduction is quite high,
while in the case of political, administrative and
cultural elites we can speak of circulation.3
However, most of the Czech elite gravitates to-
ward centre-right parties in its political prefer-
ences (this particularly applies to the economic
elite) (Srubar 1998).
One should also mention here a comparative
study on national elites which has been carried
out in the Baltic countries. It concludes that in
the case of Baltic elites, there is a combination
of continuity and change (A. Steen uses the term
elite recirculation). ¨While the nomenclature
was largely removed from power, the younger,
well educated, mid-level leaders from the former
regime are continuing and are now occupying
most of the top positions.¨ (Steen 1997, 166).4
It is thus evident that the configuration of na-
tional elites differs considerably from one post-
socialist country to another, and the same is true
for the balance between the reproduction and
circulation of elites. It is precisely the balance
and relations among recently emerged factions
of post-socialist elite that decisively determines
the character of political regimes (primarily in
terms of the division of power in a society, i.e.,
the level of its dispersal or concentration, as well
as in terms of social order in general). Gener-
ally speaking, one could maintain that the stron-
ger the civil tradition and the greater the self-
organizational potential of a society, the stron-
ger a counter-elite is capable of forming, and
the greater chance it has of maintaining demo-
cratic stability.
Types of elites in post-socialist societies dif-
fer from one another in a similar way as do the
configurations of elites. The character of a po-
litical system in fact depends to a large extent
on the type of relations among the various po-
litical elites (Field et al. 1990; Higley/Burton
1998). This is particularly true in the case of
system transformation in which elites play the
role of institution-builders (Kaminski/
Kurczewska 1994). In their classification,
Higley et al. (1998) specify four types of politi-
cal elites on the basis of two factors: level of
integration and differentiation of elites: consen-
sual, fragmented, divided and ideocratic elites.5
We may thus contend that in all the countries
of the former socialist block, there are changes
in the character of political elites; in conclusion,
we are no longer dealing with the ideocratic type
of communist elite characterized by ideologi-
cal and organizational uniformity. The configu-
ration of political elites primarily in terms of
levels of value consensus and structural inte-
gration on the one hand and levels of social,
ideological and interest differentiation on the
other varies from country to country. Higley et
al. (1998) in their analysis of post-socialist elites
observe that a consensual type of elite was
formed in the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland, that a fragmented type of elite was es-
tablished in Slovakia and Bulgaria, while a di-
vided elite emerged in Romania and Ukraine
(the situation in Russia is rather unclear in this
respect).
In countries with a consensual elite, where all
the key political players abide by the rules and
where a relative balance of power between dif-
ferent factions of political elite exists, an en-
trenchment of long-term political stability is
most likely. However, a specific part and pro-
file of the political elite is explicitly dominant
in countries where there is practically no con-
sensus on the fundamental norms of political
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activity, including most countries of the former
Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via (Serbia and Montenegro) and in Albania.
This faction of the elite usually rose from the
ranks of the former communist regime (even
though institutions of political democracy also
exist in these countries in the form of political
parties, multi-party parliament and elections).
Thus the chances for successful political trans-
formation, meaning the establishment of stable
polyarchical democracy (as well as reform of
the remaining societal spheres), are relatively
small, at least in the near future. (We deal in a
more detailed manner with the factors that in-
fluence the stability of democracy and with the
perspectives of different post-socialist states in
the third chapter.)
Our review of the evidence on the formation
and dynamics of positional elites in post-social-
ist societies clearly indicates that there is nei-
ther pure reproduction nor pure circulation but
that instead we may speak of a greater inclina-
tion to one or other form in these countries. In
the case of Slovenia, we will try to define more
precisely these mixed forms, i.e., the relations
between reproduction and circulation and their
consequences for modernization,6 democracy
and economic development.
3. The ambivalence of the Slovenian elite
configuration
The research conducted in 1995 on the
Slovene functional elites in politics, culture and
the business sector,7 provides some data on the
relations between the old elite (persons who
occupied high positions before 1988 and were
able to preserve them) and the new elite (those
assuming elite positions after 1988). In fact this
shows a fairly high level of reproduction. The
rate of reproduction amounts on average to 77%,
the highest individual level being in the busi-
ness sector (84%) and the lowest in politics
(66%), while in the culture it reaches 78%
(Kramberger 1998, 1999; Iglič/Rus 2000).
Here we must take into account the fact that
the majority of newcomers, who account for
23% of the 1995 sample of respondents (208/
899), harbour political aspirations that are closer
to the reformed and modernised old elite. Some
44% of the newcomers expressed a voting pref-
erence for the Liberal Democracy and the As-
sociated List of Social Democrats, both of which
have organisational roots in the old regime,
while 35% of them are in favour of the new
parties forming the so-called spring block (for
figures see Kramberger 1998). At the very least,
we can say that circulation (if we can speak of
it at all) has not weakened the old elite, which
we could most appropriately name the retention
elite because of its ability to take advantage of
its inherited positions in terms of social capital
and control of symbolic and material resources.
This leads us to surmise the existence of an
asymmetry between the two pillars of the po-
litical elite. In other words: we start with a the-
sis that we shall try to elaborate further  the
existence of dominant (retention) and periph-
eral (new) elite. We may reinforce our conjec-
ture with data that indicate a high level of cohe-
siveness in the sense of common political pref-
erences and dominance of the retention elite both
in terms of legitimate power  referring espe-
cially to the retention elites strong victory at
the parliamentary elections 2000 and also to
some key politicians who enjoy a very long
mandate  as well as in terms of informal influ-
ence. For example, 75% of the economic elite
(i.e., those who responded to this question)
gravitates (regarding its voting preference) to-
wards the political parties of the retention elite,
while only 16% of this elite segment gravitates
towards the block of new parties. We see a simi-
lar but less pronounced picture in the culture
elite and in the remainder of the political elite.8
Before we attempt an interpretation of these
data, we should also point out the findings from
the same investigation that show that Slovenias
retention elite is not characterised simply by a
high level of reproduction, but also by an inten-
sive fluctuation in its informal (egocentric) net-
works. From the provided data alone it would
be possible to conclude that there is a high level
of accommodation among the old elite. This elite
has replaced as much as 65% of its ties with
more prominent contact persons (Iglič/Rus
2000). These are persons from various social
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fields with whom the elite has ties and contacts,
meaning that they represent their social capital.
The fact that a high level of elite reproduction
coincides with extensive transformations in elite
contact networks tells us much about the suc-
cessful adaptation of the old elite to new social
conditions. The old elite renounced those con-
tacts which are not functional in these novel
conditions and has obtained new ones.
In sum, the findings  which must be taken
cum grano salis, because they are only partly
reliable and comparable (there are differences
in research design and sampling, some results
are outdated)  concerning elite configuration
in certain East-Central European countries
(Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland) as well as
in Slovenia, we can conclude that the former
are closer to a model of limited circulation or
combination of both forms (recirculation or
reprocirculation), while the later is closer to a
model of extended reproduction or to a pat-
tern named reproduction circulation (Higley/
Lengyel 2000, 7). To put differently: in the case
of Slovenian elite we cannot speak of simple
self-reproduction in the sense that no change or
transformation took place. But the fact remains
that there is no balance between circulation and
reproduction and that social dynamics after the
change of the regime brought about an elite con-
stellation, the nature of which should be matter
for multifaceted investigation.
Now we can return to the question of how to
interpret the data indicating a relatively high
level of reproduction among Slovene elites. We
have yet to witness any truly in-depth discus-
sion within the discipline of social sciences on
this delicate and controversial subject (see in-
formation about the similar situation in the Slo-
vak Republic in Kusa 1997). Nevertheless, we
could summarise two points of view from the
debates that have erupted in recent times. Ac-
cording to the first, represented and revealed to
the public by one of the authors of this article
(Adam 1999), the high level of elite reproduc-
tion produces a long-term malignant effect (al-
though this possibly may not be apparent in the
short term), including a possible shift towards
oligarchic democracy or delegate democracy
(ODonnell 1994), as well as the establishment
of monopolies and rent-seeking behaviour. The
opposing point of view stresses the benign ef-
fect of elite reproduction, especially political
stability; at the same time it relativises the sig-
nificance of data indicating a high level of elite
continuity (Iglič/Rus 2000; Kramberger 1999).
We can in fact cite points of view and argu-
ments which tend to tone down the air of drama
surrounding the data on high reproduction and
continuity of the old elite. The first argument is
concealed within the results of research into
elites in other transition countries. Certain na-
tional (political) elites reformed themselves in
the 1980s and neutralised their dogmatic
hardcore segment by replacing it with techno-
crats; such elites have demonstrated in the 1990s
a greater level of elite reproduction and less cir-
culation (Hanley et al. 1995). This would at first
seem to be the case in Hungary and Slovenia,
and to a lesser extent in Poland. Yet the data do
not entirely confirm this hypothesis; they show
no major differences (except in the sense of
class reproduction) in reproduction/circulation
between the Hungarian, Polish and Czech elites,
while Slovenia is marked by considerably higher
reproduction.
Another argument would appear to be that
Slovenia is a small social system, which is ex-
periencing difficulties attaining a critical mass
from which a more numerous elite might be re-
cruited. Some believe that such systems are then
condemned to reproduce one and the same elite
(Kramberger 1999). The question is whether
such views arise from a deterministic concep-
tion of the elite dynamics or whether they are
just an attempt to legitimise the status quo.
The third argument for the predominance of
the retention elite is supposed to lie in the fact
that Slovene society has not only just gone
through a process of systemic change, but has
also acquired a new nation/state framework. A
part of the old elite was active in the process of
gaining independence, and in this way it ac-
quired further legitimacy necessary to continue
in power.9
The fourth argument, which puts into perspec-
tive the data on high reproduction, is derived
from the work of an external observer, an Ameri-
can sociologist who is also an authority on the
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study of elites, Professor Higley. In his opinion
 expressed in an interview he gave for a
Slovene weekly in September 1999 during an
international conference on transition elites in
Ljubljana  there is indeed a high level of re-
production of elites in Slovenia, however since
there has been a change of elites in power, this
fact has no major problematic significance
(Higley 1999). Despite the fact that this new elite
had been in power for only two years (1990
1992), this period is seen as sufficient for the
self-transformation of the old elite, which is
supposed to have become flexible and adapt-
able.
Nevertheless, it is also possible to reassess
those interpretations that relativise the signifi-
cance of data on the high reproduction of elites
in Slovenia and to demonstrate their weakness.
In regard to the first argument on the
modernisation of the old elite, which some in-
terpret as recognition of its competence, we
could say that this is true only in part. Although
it should be considered with some reservation,
one can find in the recent World Competitive-
ness Yearbook published by the Institute Man-
agement Development in Loussane that Slovene
managers lag behind their Hungarian counter-
parts in terms of quality and skills (although they
are better off than their counterparts in the Czech
Republic and Poland). The situation is signifi-
cantly more problematic concerning Slovenias
administrative elite (including the judiciary),
which in terms of efficiency ranks 44th place out
of 47 countries (while Slovenia occupies 39th
place in the general index of competitiveness).
The second argument, which refers to a small
critical mass, may also be interpreted as an ar-
gument in favour of greater circulation: small
social systems such as Slovenia must be very
attentive to the mechanisms and criteria of se-
lection for elite positions (if they lose only a
few competent people this can have quite nega-
tive consequences). The third argument for the
legitimacy of the retention elite does hold wa-
ter, but it cannot be an argument that in some
peoples understanding justifies the irreplace-
ability of key politicians from this elite echelon.
In connection with Higleys assertion about the
exchange of elites (fourth argument), we may
state that it is not analytically supported by spe-
cific examples or empirical evidence. Merely
short-term or token exchange of the old elite
with a new one cannot guarantee democratic
development.
After weighing the arguments and counter-
arguments concerning the significance of the
high level of reproduction of elites, we arrive at
two tentative, but more or less cardinal, conclu-
sions. 1) The debate on this issue has to be un-
derstood as an analysis of the foundations for a
rational strategy that might lead to a competent
and educated national elite. 2) Slovenia cannot
possibly do away with a part of the old elite, or
rather this would make no sense; instead, it can
achieve an optimal (and realistic) quality of
functional elite through a greater level of circu-
lation from the potential elite (the highly edu-
cated stratum) to the elite positions. As for the
political elite, it should be emphasised that the
assertion that determining some kind of nor-
mal levels of elite reproduction is impossible
(Higley 1999, 28) can be challenged. Instead,
reproduction must be low enough and circula-
tion high enough (or vice versa) as to allow for
the formation of a counter-elite which in re-
sources and legitimacy should be comparable
to the (old) elite recently in power (and vice
versa).
We cannot yet provide a final assessment of
the malign or benign nature of elite configura-
tion in Slovenia. Further analysis is needed con-
cerning the influence of this configuration on
the political system and on socio-economic per-
formance. Yet we can already state  and dis-
cussion thus far confirms this  that this is a
complex task. Despite its small size and trans-
parency, Slovenia is in many ways a multifac-
eted and contradictory example of a transition
society.
4. Processes of democratization in the light
of elite reproduction/circulation
From what has been discussed previously we
might derive a thesis  or hypothesis  stating
that the existence of an elite and counter-elite,
or rather the differentiation between elites, is
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one of the key structural foundations of a demo-
cratic regime. This implies that (excessively)
high levels of elite reproduction are not com-
patible with democracy. Yet we must be more
precise here, for here we are referring to a
polyarchic type of democracy with several cen-
tres of power and influence, marked primarily
by horizontal accountability (ODonnell
1998). Oligarchic or delegate democracy refers
to something else, and is characterised by a con-
centration of power and weak mechanisms of
control and responsibility (the media, courts, an
autonomous central bank, court of auditors), as
well as the weak participation of citizens. In their
latest work, Higley/Lengyel (2000) argue that
circulation is conductive to the creation and
persistence of a consensual type of elite which
is most compatible with democratic stability.
In order to arrive at more solid findings, we
must take into account other factors influenc-
ing the constitution of a democracy resembling
either the polyarchic or the oligarchic model.
Of these factors  we might call them risk fac-
tors  the following are the most important:
1) Excessively high elite reproduction (insuf-
ficient circulation) prevents the emergence of
a dynamic equilibrium between the (old) in-
herited elite echelon and the (new) counter-
elite.
2) Exchange (transfer) of power. Since a
change of regime involving the old elite be-
ing in opposition for a given period has not
occurred, this further enhances the effect of
elite reproduction.
3) Longer periods of government by one po-
litical party elite. Even if in transitional coun-
tries this period is not so long as it is in the
case of established polyarchic democracies
(where there are cases of three or four suc-
cessive terms in power; the scandal with the
illicit financing of German CDU indicates that
this factor is really risky), it still contributes
to the petrifaction and disproportion in power
and influence between the governing or domi-
nant elite and the counter-elite.
4) Relationship of co-operation and competi-
tion between individual pillars (factions) of
the political elite. Of course this relationship
is problematic in situations of divergence and
confrontation (when there is no longer con-
sensus), but excessive consensus which un-
dermines mutual control and existence of
quasi-solidarity (esprit de corps) also hinder
the operation of democratic institutions.
5) The institutional framework (environment),
which either hinders or stimulates oligarchic
tendencies (e.g., parliamentary or presiden-
tial system).
Countries exposed to all the above risk fac-
tors face the largest problems regarding the de-
velopment of democratic institutions. In first
place are Belarus and Serbia (or rather the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia).10  Other examples
include Slovakia and Croatia. The former had,
what was untypical for a transitional country, a
long period of rule by one (Mečiars) party (from
19921998). The turnover occurred (i.e., the
communist party went into opposition) when
Slovakia was still a part of Czechoslovakia (in
19901992). In Croatia there was a change
(since 1990 the former elite, which transformed
itself into the social democratic party, has been
in opposition), but Tudjmans HDZ had been in
power for nearly ten years (19901999). Apart
from this, Croatia has a presidential system
which exacerbates the effects of a long period
of one-party government; and these effects are
similar to those brought about by high repro-
duction.
If, on the other hand we look at those transi-
tion countries ranked as having achieved sig-
nificant results in democratisation, we see that
Hungary and Poland have quite a favourable
balance between elite reproduction and circula-
tion: a regular change of government, no overly
long periods of rule by one political party elite,
competitive relations among factions of the po-
litical elite (although at the same time there is a
basic consensus), and a political institutional
framework closer to a parliamentary democracy
than to a presidential system. As for the Czech
Republic  which is not exposed to the factors
of risk, except for factor 4  we may have ob-
served recently quite an intensive, yet non-trans-
parent, co-operation in the form of a tacit agree-
ment between Zemans Social Democratic party,
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which is in power (in a coalition government)
and Klauss centre-right opposition party (ODS)
(Cabada 1999). This configuration of political
elites, which results in insufficient mutual con-
trol, in all likelihood gives rise to difficulties in
the political sphere, as well as a slowing down
in the implementing of economic reforms. There
are also increased aspirations of the ruling par-
ties to colonize the society in accordance to
their particular interests. (The last example of
such aspirations was the attempt to assume con-
trol over the Czech public television, which had
failed because of strong public revolt.) The con-
sequence of such conduct is a decline of satis-
faction with the new elites and a rise of support
for the communist party.
In the case of Slovenia, we have arrived at
the following conclusions: A relatively high
level of reproduction has been mentioned. There
have been two turnovers of the elites in power:
in the period from 1990 to 1992, during the gov-
ernment of the non-communist coalition Demos
and in 2000 when for less than half a year the
so-called spring parties assumed power. These
changes were short-lived, however, and the Lib-
eral Democratic Party, the leading force of the
(modernised) retention elite, has been in power
for the last nine years. In regard to the fourth
factor, the situation is somewhat atypical. Rela-
tions between the factions of the political elite
are hard to identify, for they are a mixture of
conflicting, fragmented and consensual ele-
ments. Institutional solutions (Slovenia has a
pure parliamentary system, proportional repre-
sentation and coalition governments) in fact tend
more to hinder than support developments to-
wards oligarchic tendencies.
According to the Nations in Transit 2001 re-
port conducted by Freedom House, Slovenia
belongs to the group of consolidated democ-
racies in regard to the quality of its democracy,
thus sharing third place with Hungary, Litva and
Latvia, and is lagging behind Poland and the
Czech Republic. We can see therefore that
Slovenia is among the most successful post-
socialistic countries; all the same, some coun-
tries are ahead of it. In our opinion, conditions
in the last few years have even worsened in some
aspects. This holds true especially in the field
of media pluralism, where the consequences of
monopolies are apparent, deriving from the pre-
vious regime (Rupel 1999), and have endured
with the help of wild privatisation and, lately,
with the help of deregulation and com-
mercialisation (Hrvatin/Kerevan 1999).
There is clear evidence of other oligarchic
tendencies, or rather tendencies that testify to
the inadequate structure of horizontal account-
ability (this relates chiefly to the judiciary,
which has already been mentioned several times
as a weak point in reports from the European
Commission in Brussels). Moreover, certain
reforms that may jeopardise the advantages held
by the old elite are being slowly implemented
(privatisation, property restitution). As far as the
political culture is concerned, we may also ob-
serve phenomena which we might ascribe to the
great influence of the old elite and to the persis-
tence of certain political figures (the phenom-
enon of irreplaceability); this involves a latent
cult of the powerful leader, and is indicated also
in international value surveys (e.g., Rose et al.
1999, 111). In general, we can say that Slovenia
is already demonstrating the negative conse-
quences of a relatively high level of reproduc-
tion of elites and other risk factors; however,
counter-tendencies also exist, and special em-
phasis should be given to the relatively success-
ful socio-economic development of recent years.
5. Elite configuration and economic
performance and reforms
In analysing the political characteristics of a
system it is significant to determine if and to
what extent they influence or are related to other
developmental performances of society, particu-
larly the economic one. Concerning the classic
issue concerning whether or not democracy has
a positive influence on economic development,
researchers opinions differ. In this regard, there
are some assertions that no clear linkage is ap-
parent between democracy and economic
growth (Przeworski/Limongi 1993; Siermann
1998). In our opinion this is not the case (see
also Huber et al. 1997). Countries with a devel-
oped democracy belong, almost without excep-
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tion, to the group of economically most devel-
oped and richest countries. If the chosen crite-
rion is the Human Development Index (HDI),
which measures the state of the human resources
or the quality of life in an individual country, or
the World Competitiveness Index (WCI), which
measures complete systemic competitiveness,
we can find that the first twenty positions are
all occupied by democratic countries. Further-
more, the majority of them suit the criteria for a
polyarchic democracy. The so-called Asian ti-
gers  Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong  are
to some extent exceptional, which may be due
to their specific cultural context. In the major-
ity of the remaining developed countries, there
is a relative balance between a ruling elite and
an opposing counter-elite. This enables their
(more or less frequent) alteration of power po-
sitions.
In the context of the post-socialist transition
we can also notice relatively close connections
between the development of democracy and
economic performance. Therefore, according to
the Nations in Transit 2001 report, the coun-
tries that have executed economic reforms most
successfully are for the most part the same coun-
tries that have advanced furthest in the process
of democratisation. Slovenia also belong to this
group, although it occupies only fifth place 
behind Poland, Hungary, Estonia and the Czech
Republic. It should be stated, however, that
Slovenia ranks first regarding certain key macro-
economic indicators such as GDP per capita,
purchasing power and level of living standard
(Slovenia is, according to the Human Develop-
ment Report for the year 2001, positioned in
29th place, while the Czech Republic, as sec-
ond best, holds 34th place).11  This is due in large
part to the better starting position and relatively
well-developed civilisational competence, the
result of specific historical and geo-political cir-
cumstances (see more about this in Adam et al.
2001).
One may argue that a high level of elite re-
production, accompanied by the domination of
the modernized old or retention elite, also in-
fluences the functioning of the economic sys-
tem. Some reforms which could consequently
weaken the position of the elite, are carried out
(too) slowly. This is true mostly in the case of
the transformation of the ownership structure,
that is, the privatisation of the former common
(social) property (critiques concerning overly
slow privatisation are also a standard issue in
the reports of the Commission of the European
Union concerning the advancement of the can-
didate states). It is interesting to note that the
proportion of state property is much larger in
the case of Slovenia than it is in other candidate
states. Under such conditions, which make pos-
sible an extensive intervention of politics in the
functioning of the economy, there is a potential
danger of the proliferation of clientelistic and
corruptive practices. The next problematic ele-
ment of ownership transformation is a delayed
process of property restitution, i.e., the process
of returning property confiscated during the
communist era to its rightful owners or to their
legal descendants (such a delay gives rise to
serious doubts concerning the functioning of the
rule of law). The mentioned reforms are ex-
pected to be implemented for European Union
membership  which is Slovenias strategic goal
 and are, together with other changes (reform
of the retirement system, reform of state admin-
istration, greater openness to foreign investment,
etc.), crucial for the attainment of a long-term
socio-economic development. Parallel to this,
individual economists have recently called at-
tention to certain alarming trends such as the
growing public debt, external debt and external
trade deficit (Jazbec/Damjan 2001).
The type of socio-economic order emerging
in Slovenia could be defined as an unusual com-
bination of managerial capitalism with a
strong state or public sector in the sense of state
or bureaucratic capitalism. Concerning this we
can state, on the basis of past experience, that
such a combination may have certain positive
as well as negative effects on economic devel-
opment. It is not just in the sense of procrasti-
nation of reforms, which is a consequence of
holding on to advantages and acquired positions
as well as to inertia, but also of restricting ac-
cess to potential competitors, particularly to
those actors who might occupy elite positions
if entry were based more on meritocratic crite-
ria and on the functional autonomy of sub-
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systems. In the case of the economic elite, the
fact that there are very few new entrepreneurs
(mittelstand) is a manifestation of this; entre-
preneurs that do exist are faced with a whole
range of obstacles and with very few incentives.
Restitution is also a mechanism for generating
a potential business elite, and in both cases 
the same is true for the inflow of foreign capital
and foreign competitors  the retention elite is
trying to slow down those reforms and legisla-
tion that could endanger its positions and mo-
nopolies. On the other hand, the economic part
of the retention elite  thanks to the privatisation
model favouring dispersed insider ownership 
was able to introduce some restructuring mea-
sures such as down-sizing and other ratio-
nalisations at the enterprise level (Stanovnik/
Kovačič 1999). This in general increased pro-
ductivity (and of course unemployment) in
Slovenia, which, along with Poland, is the only
transition country that succeeded after ten years
to reach its 1988 GDP level. But the limits of
this approach are evident; managerial capital-
ists (see more about this phenomenon in Eyal
et al. 1998)  with the exception of some im-
portant cases  have failed to bring their com-
panies to a higher technological level and to
facilitate new developmental cycles (Stanovnik/
Kovačič 1999). Not only is an acceleration of
reforms an agenda; without technological
modernisation and productive foreign capital
(FDI) it will not be possible to attain a long-
term competitive position within the EU. What
is required is a new kind of co-operation be-
tween the state (political-administrative elite)
and strategic business groups that will be based
on the functional autonomy of both sides and
free from clientelistic bonds.12
6. Discussion
It is evident that the successful formation of a
stable democracy and long-term sustained socio-
economic development depend greatly upon the
structure of the political sphere, the relations
between various factions of the political elite as
well as on the nature of the whole elite constel-
lation. Here focus is on the relative dispersion
of power in the sense of the circulation of po-
litical elites in positions of power and also on
the openness on the part of national elites (in
various fields, such as economy, culture, etc.)
towards entry of new members exclusively on
the basis of meritocratic criteria as mechanisms
for social promotion.
It is not our intention to argue that the politi-
cal elite represents the only factor of demo-
cratisation. The situation in post-socialist soci-
eties as well as the types of political order are
influenced also by other factors such as (inher-
ited) dynamics of economic development, the
level of cultural capital (mainly the level of edu-
cation of the population), the level of civil soci-
ety development, political culture (rootedness
of democratic values) as well as other elements
of tradition (work and vocational ethics, ability
and motivation for collective action and self-
organisation, internalisation of formal-legal and
bureaucratic disciplines as well as fundamental
functional knowledge) (Adam et al. 2001, 28f.).
However, the successful constitution of the
democratic system is not simply the predeter-
mined product of certain cultural, historical and
material conditions but is also the result of po-
litical actors with their specific interests, pas-
sions, memories and virtues (Schmitter 1992,
425). Under the specific conditions of a transi-
tion from an authoritarian (or totalitarian) type
of social order in a democratic one, the role of
the political subsystem is all the more impor-
tant, such is also the role of the political elite as
the subsystems main carrier, given that it is re-
sponsible for establishing the structural condi-
tions (systemic infrastructures, mainly the leg-
islative framework) for the normal function-
ing of other social areas and their autonomous
development.
A sufficient degree of differentiation among
political elites and their circulation, in the form
of at least two comparably powerful political
parties or blocks, undoubtedly represents a cru-
cial condition for the dynamics and consequent
viability of a political system. What is at stake
is not the persistence of the old (retention) elite
in itself, nor the dilemma as to, whether old or
new, leftist or rightist parties are more suitable
to assume power; instead, what is at stake is the
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establishment of an appropriate balance between
governing and non-governing elite, between
competition and cooperation, between conflict
and consensus.13
As far as the quite ambiguous situation in the
Slovenian case study is concerned, we identi-
fied certain less promising side-effects of the
existing elite formation and of its emerging
structure of (latent) power. In this sense our
analysis can be considered as an early warn-
ing and as a contribution to the rational intel-
lectual discourse about the future of democracy
at the national and international levels.
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